

REVEALED for the first time...:

how Britain's spymaster for 9 years
was accused of working for the KGB

Wall
World
exclusive

THE SPY WHO
KILLED KGB
SPY
IN
LONDON
IS
NOT
A
SOVIET
AGENT
BUT
A
CIA
SPY
WHO
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FOR
9
YEARS

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

SECRET SOURCE

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SIR ROGER HOLLIS, head of MI5 from 1956 to 1965, is feared to have been a KGB agent.

I can reveal that, shortly after he retired, Sir Roger was called back to an official and unprecedented interview, covering the 30 years during which he stood either near or at the top of this country's security services.

For 48 hours, in a MI5 safe house in London, he was interrogated about his past life and associations by men who had been his juniors in the service. But Sir Roger never cracked, though his answers to questions were regarded as unsatisfactory.

He died in 1973. The following year Lord Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet or Civil Servants, was secretly recalled from retirement to conduct an astonishing inquiry into the possibility that Sir Roger had been a spy for almost 10 years.

Lord Trend was also asked to pass judgment on evidence suggesting that another most senior officer of MI5 had also been a spy of the same time. Lord Trend concluded after his three weeks' study that there was a strong prima facie case that MI5 had been deeply penetrated over many years by someone who was not Sir Anthony Blunt.

He named Sir Roger Hollis as a likely suspect in the circumstantial evidence against him being so weighty as to demand explanation.

Lord Trend said that Hollis had not denied himself during the interrogation which had taken place shortly after his retirement.

He had provided unconvincing answers to the searching questions which had been put to him and his memory had been at fault only when it suited him.

The evidence showed, said Lord Trend, that Hollis had consistently frustrated attempts by loyal MI5 officers who investigated the obvious penetration of their service. His behaviour during the investigation into Anthony Blunt had been particularly suspicious. Lord Trend recommended that the case against Hollis should be left open pending the arrival of further evidence from a new defector from the Communist bloc or some other source.

Delayed

But Lord Trend cleared the other senior officer whose code-name was 'Peters' during the investigation.

The inquiry report, which was received by very few Ministers and officials, also criticised the way the investigations against both Hollis and 'Peters' had been delayed for many months. Inside MI5 by people clutch unwilling to believe they had been

scandalised. This, Britain's latest and most sensational security scandal, is bound to lead to calls for a full-scale inquiry into the whole history of this country's intelligence community since the end of the war.

Even though it proved impossible to prove Sir Roger's guilt, either by Lord Trend or by a Secret Service Security Service Committee (called the Flushing Committee) which investigated the MI5 had also been a spy of the same time.

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Sir Roger Hollis and his second wife in 1969

United Stars & Strips 30, City 34, Classified Advert 32-28-35

Daily Mail, Monday, March 23, 1981

The Hollis Affair

M16 The secret file on Britain's greatest spy sensation



BY CHAPMAN PINCHER

BALTIMORE'S FOREMOST AUTHORITY ON ESPIONAGE

THIS is the story of what is perhaps one of the most dramatic and sensational secret investigations ever conducted in the history of this country.

Over a period of several years, from 1963 to 1974, loyal officers of MI5 conducted a long, exhaustive and exhausting inquiry into the alarming probability that there was a 'mole', a long-standing Soviet agent implanted deep in the heart of our Intelligence Services...

What is more, as the old files were dusted off when MI5 officers began the laborious process of back-tracking old operations, it was clear that if there was a 'mole', he was placed close to the very pinnacle of the agency.

Eventually, these MI5 officers, first acting officially, and then manufacturing a postscript to the Secret Service file to work with them on a joint committee, called the Phoenix Committee, conducted the most difficult and the most sensitive inquiry which either agency had ever been involved in.

With a quickening sense of foreboding, the investigators narrowed the short list of possible 'moles' down to five, including one woman. Each was fed 'barium metal', specially doctored documents of vital information which might enable the investigators to ascertain where the leakages came from.

The suspects were quickly narrowed down to three and then to two. One, a very senior officer in MI5, was given the code-name 'Peters'. The other, astonishingly and frighteningly, was the Head of the Service himself, Sir Roger Hollis.

Two-way mirror

'Peters' himself was put through the most remarkable series of tests. His telephones at work were bugged, even the mirror in his office was removed and replaced by a two-way mirror behind which a television camera recorded every move. Despite all, Peters was in the clear, leaving the last of the five Sir Roger Hollis as the chief suspect. The unimaginable now seemed possible. The Head of the Security Service could have been a Russian agent.

By then, Sir Roger had retired and was living on a modest pension in a tiny cottage in the beautiful village of Catticom in Somerset. He was a very model of the distinguished retired public servant. He was a Rural District councillor, captain of the present Burnham-Berrow Golf Club and president of the Somerset Golfing Union. He had been knighted by the Queen in 1960 and the only

bit of public scandal which had ever touched his life was when, in February 1966, after 22 years of marriage, he was divorced by his wife. He then married his secretary of 18 years standing, Miss Edith 'Val' Hammond.

Sir Roger, the son of a Bishop, was born in 1905, educated at Clifton College in Bristol and Worcester College, Oxford, which he entered in 1924.

However, he left without a degree as he felt he would not do well in the examinations and joined the British American Tobacco Company working for them for nine years in China. There, he contracted TB and was sent to Switzerland for a cure and in 1938 returned to England apparently with no prospects. He had no degree, his health was poor and the only job he could find was as a clerk-typist. Yet, within a year, he managed to worm his way into MI5, quickly rising to become Acting Head of Section F—responsible for overseeing Soviet and Communist operations in the UK and Colonies. Then in the early 1950s, he became Deputy Director-General of MI5 and in 1956, when the then top man, Dick White, moved over to the Secret Service, Director-General of MI5 and the man in charge of all of Britain's security services.

What is more, as the old files were dusted off when MI5 officers began the laborious process of back-tracking old operations, it was clear that if there was a 'mole', he was placed close to the very pinnacle of the agency.

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Safe house

But all of that was in the past as Sir Roger was enjoying his retirement in his idyllic rural retreat where he was looked up to and respected by local people.


That peace was finally shattered when on a day in 1970 he was told that he was required to come to London to MI5 headquarters to face allegations which had been made about him. There he met his successor, Sir Martin Furnival Jones, who told him that accusations which had arisen about his past activities had to be cleared up. The man who had once and for so long been the chief of the department now faced the humiliation of being taken to a safe house 'nervously to face 48 hours of virtual non-stop interrogation.'

Then, and during a subsequent interrogation, Sir Roger never broke. His frustrated interrogators believed that they had before them the most successful spy in history—a KGB agent so successful that he made the notorious spies of the past like Burgess and Maclean, Philby and Blunt look very much in the second league.

But in order to prove it, they needed a confession and this they were not able to get.

Primarily, Sir Roger would have been buried forever within the vaults of the MI5 if certain members of that service and the Secret Service had not been so concerned about the astonishing scale of Soviet penetration into the service over such a long period of time and had not agitated privately for an independent inquiry.

It was because of that pressure that the Cabinet Committee was formed. Sir John Mountbatten, Sir John's retired predecessor, Lord Trend, to carry out a personal investigation. By that time Hollis was dead, but Lord Trend



ENTERING MARRIED LIFE: Roger Hollis, in 1937, with Evelyn Esme Swayne.

had put before him the evidence which proved without question that since the war there had been a Soviet 'mole' buried within the foremost echelons of MI5—a 'mole' who was other than Anthony Blunt.

This week I will present this extraordinary saga in public for the first time in the pages of the Daily Mail.

For the first time, the public will learn how the KGB controlled MI5 almost completely—almost thanks to traitors in high places, and for the first time, too, I will reveal the real truth behind the Philby Affair, Anthony

Blunt and all the other notorious post-war spy cases which have so disfigured the political landscape of this country.

I will reveal, as well, details of other spies, once respected people in our society, who also sold their souls to the KGB, who betrayed their country and their friends.

I will deal first with my files on Hollis... these documents which with remorseless logic build to such a shocking conclusion.

The tell-tale clues: Next page

The Hollis Affair



The jigsaw of clues at a super-mole somewhere

THE CASE OF COLONEL PRIBYL

200 leaks that told the KGB every move that MI5 made

THAT there was a 'mole' in MI5 — whether or not he was Sir Roger Hollis — there had never been any doubt. During the whole of the decade from 1951-1961, MI5 had achieved no major success against the Russians — an appalling indictment of the organisation.

Slowly, at first in dribs and drabs and finally in a flood, loyal MI5 officers came to the certain conclusion that the reason for this was that the service itself had been penetrated at the highest level.

Hard and frightening evidence came in which proved that the Russians knew every move that MI5 was making. They could only have had that information if they had a 'mole' at the top. Look at some of the facts.

A defector from the Czech Embassy in Washington described a conversation which he had had with the Oldrich Pribyl, the Czech Military Attaché in London. Pribyl had told him how he had once been followed by what he thought was an MI5 vehicle in London while debriefing one of several British traitors. He took evasive action, but he was so concerned that the British might know what he was up to he consulted the Russian Military Attaché in London.

Spring a trap

The Russian explained that as it was a Bank Holiday weekend he could not find out immediately, but would give him the answer on Tuesday. Sure enough, on that day, the Russian told Pribyl that MI5 watchers had indeed been following him but had given up the chase because they had decided that he was only giving a colleague driving instructions.

This information horrified MI5 because it was correct. Pribyl had also related that

the Russians had warned him that MI5 men who tailed Soviet Bloc cars had changed their tactics. Instead of waiting near Communist Embassies, where they could be easily seen, they were waiting by the main Thames bridges which the Soviet Bloc spies were likely to use. As a result, no Russian ever came near the bridges.

Colonel Pribyl also revealed how MI5 tried to spring a trap for him. British technician Brian Linney was providing highly secret information about a new RAP missile which he had picked up while working as an engineer in a factory at Shoreham in Sussex. The plan was to arrest Linney at the moment he was handing the material over to Pribyl so that they both could be brought to MI5. MI5 knew of this arrangement and the crucial meeting between the two. Linney turned up but Pribyl, though the information was vital to the Russians, never left his office. He had clearly been warned.

MI5 had been convinced for many years that the British Communist Party was in regular receipt of substantial sums of money from the Soviet Government which was handed in cash to a senior Party member who served as paymaster.

'Granny' installed

The transfers of cash in shoe boxes had been observed, but what MI5 wanted to see was the ledger showing how the Russian money was dispersed and whether and how used for espionage and subversion purposes. So the MI5 paid the MI5 paymaster. He lived in a two-storey house divided into two single-floor flats. One day it was seen that he was advertising for a tenant for the bottom floor flat so a security man applied for it through the agency and installed a 'Granny', as such women agents are called.

Soon afterwards, at Christmas, when the paymaster went to stay for two days with another Communist in the country, the MI5 men decided to search his flat. They never did so because it was a friend's house where he was staying and was let by the wretched following him, so the break-in had to be called off. In case he was on his way back. When he returned home on the day after Boxing Day, he gave the 'Granny' a week's notice, refusing to give any reason. The MI5 top management had been told about the projected operation only two days before-



COLONEL OLDRICH PRIBYL: Defector with a strange knowledge of MI5's tactics.

hand, its approval being necessary before the flat could be entered.

Having access to an ingenious device, not at all like the probe microphone, MI5 was keen to use it in counter-espionage work against the Soviet Consulate in Bayswater Road, which was known to harbour several dangerous KGB spies. Knowing the details of the building, MI5 technicians were able to bore a hole through a party wall so that it came out behind a moulded leaf, in the high frieze of a specially selected room of the Consulate. The hole, where it emerged behind the leaf, was no wider than a pin and there was no way in which it could have been detected by accident.

The microphone operated successfully for only a short time. At a later date,

when a chance opportunity presented itself to an inside agent who is no longer active, examination of the pin-hole showed that it had been plugged up with plaster, rendering the whole apparatus useless. The MI5 officers involved in the operation were in no doubt that it had been betrayed by a source which could only be inside MI5.

So damaging


In 1962, Anatoli Golitsin, a senior KGB officer with a mass of information, defected to the CIA from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki. Among the many leads he provided, he revealed that the Soviet Embassy in London had no 'SK' (for Soviet Colon) Department. This is a group of KGB officers installed in

almost every Russian Embassy to ensure that there are no defectors from the ranks. Golitsin explained that the Russians had such an excellent source in MI5 that they could be confident of being warned of any likely defector in London. So no SK officers were needed.

All in all, investigators established 48 clear leaks of precious information of this kind to the Soviets, and as the investigation proceeded this list was to grow to an astonishing 200 incidents.

Overwhelmingly the investigators proved that these leaks—so damaging to the defence of the realm—could only have come from someone from the very highest echelons of the Security Services.

ties that proved there was nowhere at the top of MI5



WHILE one group of investigators looked into the files seeking evidence of Soviet penetration, another group investigated the rather strange history of Sir Roger himself. What they came up with was alarming.

Certainly, they showed that Sir Roger had been less than frank when he first applied to join MI5, particularly concerning his past associates. No one knew exactly when his past began, but two of his closest friends at Oxford were members of the Communist Party, both to become well-known journalists and writers.

No one knew, until the investigators found it out for themselves, that while in Shanghai he had become friendly with an American Left-Wing journalist and a dedicated agent for the Russians who had been deeply involved with Soviet spy rings then active in Shanghai.

And no one knew that he had known a notorious

Soviet agent, the "particularly brutal" recruiter for the KGB. This was how the CIA described him when it was the CIA that was investigating Hollis's background. He was known for the ruthlessness with which he used bribery, women and blackmail to secure agents. Hollis, it was shown, was susceptible to sexual indulgence and developed a notable reputation as a lady's man.

Prominent recruit

What was significant, too, was the persistence with which Hollis had got into MI5. He had been rejected once by an MI5 Board and also by the Secret Service. But this did not put him off. He tried everything he knew to break in and eventually succeeded when he met an MI5 officer at a tennis party and was finally recommended for recruitment.

Assuming for a moment that Hollis was already in the hands of the KGB, then he was certainly running true to type. Whenever Soviet intelligence secures a prominent recruit, he or she is pushed to secure a job in MI5, the Secret Service, Government Communications Headquarters, the Times, the BBC, the Foreign Office or the Home Office, as ordered. There is, of course, nothing wrong in a young man trying hard to get into the Security Services, but when, in the process, he conceals extremely relevant aspects of his past life, then that is bound to raise suspicions about his activities.

As for Hollis's behaviour, once he was established as the Director-General of MI5, that, too, caught the attention of the security investigators. His habit of remaining late in his office in Leadenhall House in Curzon Street, often until about 8 p.m., suggested some activity which he wished to keep private.

More suspicious


But there was something infinitely more suspicious which came to light than that. A meticulous search of MI5 files revealed that there was a locked drawer in an antique desk which had not been used for years. Examination showed that, unlike all the other drawers, the edges of which were dusty, the locked drawer had recently been in use.

One evening Hollis was asked for his permission for this drawer to be opened the following morning by means of a skeleton key. He agreed. When, on the next day, the drawer was eased out there was nothing inside, but from marks on the desk it was obvious that same file object on four occasions had been in the drawer on more than one occasion. What was the object? The investigators assumed it to be a tape recorder.

It was in this room that weekly meetings took place to decide how MI5 men watching opposition agents were to be used. Hollis himself did not attend but a recording of what occurred would have obviously been of enormous value.

THE CASE OF IGOR GOUZENKO

Curious link with a Blenheim Palace base



IGOR GOUZENKO: No wonder he faced the cameras hooded . . . his information changed for ever our views of Soviet espionage.

IN 1945 when the West was slowly waking up to the dangers posed by Soviet imperialism, a top level defector from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa sought the protection of the Canadian Government.

It was quickly realized that Igor Gouzenko was one of the most valuable sources of information about Soviet intentions in the Western world and even had the information he produced was to change for ever the rosy view some had about Soviet intentions in the world once the war was over. Gouzenko, who had worked in the main cipher room of Soviet Military Intelligence in Moscow, had been able to monitor the secret radio traffic between Moscow and its spies all over the world. The stories which he had to tell were hair-raising.

Valuable

Gouzenko was able to reveal that the Russians had an agent working in MI5 whose code-name was 'Elli'. And he also revealed that through 'Elli', the Russians had top secret files which could only have come from the war-time MI5 out-station as

Blenheim Palace, Oxford. Though this information was of the first importance, a subsequent investigation showed that it did nothing at all about Gouzenko's material.

When questioned as to why this was in 1952, Gouzenko himself said that 'Elli' had probably smothered every piece of information that Gouzenko had brought with him. Startlingly, it was subsequently realized that the man MI5 sent to Ottawa to interrogate Gouzenko was none other than Ronald Hocken.

Reading his reports many years later, it was found that on his return to London he had reported the minimum amount of information to the Department about this most valuable defector.

As they went through the Gouzenko

LADY FALKENDER remembers when Sir Harold Wilson was told in 1975 about the suspicions centring around Roger Hollis. He emerged from a meeting and said: 'Now I have heard everything. I have just been told that the Head of MI5 himself may have been a double agent.'

file, suspicious MI5 officers began to ask this alarming question: Had the 'Elli' allegations been investigated on the spot in Canada by 'Elli' himself?

But there was more to it than that. MI5 now believed, because of the Blenheim link, that they had why. In December 1940, a professional Russian spy, an expert wireless operator, Ursula Beurton, had been sent to Britain from an important job in Switzerland to live in Oxford. Later, in 1942, she was able to serve as a courier for the atom bomb spy Klaus Fuchs. But the big question which had long puzzled the security men was who had she been working for until then.

Now it looked as if they had the answer. They knew Beurton had been in contact with someone through dead-letter boxes in Oxford — secret hiding places where messages could be left or gathered. One, for example, was set in a tomb in a certain graveyard in the locality. No one knew that Beurton possessed the Blenheim files. It didn't take too much a stretch of the imagination to guess what material she was sending.

Only one man had access to all these documents. His name was Roger Hollis.

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Daily Mail, Monday, March 23, 1981

The Hollis Affair

The smokescreen confession

IT WAS the circumstances surrounding the defection of Kim Philby from Beirut in 1963 which were finally to force a reluctant Intelligence Establishment to probe in depth the whole question of Russian penetration.

Though the Security Services were convinced that Kim Philby was a Russian mole there was no hard evidence against him. He had been interrogated by a judicial inquiry and had successfully stonewalled the legendary Jim Skardon, the MI5 interrogator who had broken Klaus Fuchs, the atom spy, in the 1940s. But he confessed to nothing.

It was, I can report, a Jewish woman, normally resident in London, who provided the evidence which was to nail him. She was attending a cocktail party in Israel and was heard to say that she was extremely angry at the way Philby was shaping his articles in the Observer against the Israelis and in favour of the Arabs.

Evidence

He was supporting Nasser and Nasserite nationalists in the South Yemen, and elsewhere in the Arab world. As usual, Philby is doing what his Russian controller tells him," she said. "I know that he's always worked for the Russians."

These remarks were reported back to London and she was asked to make a statement to the security authorities. Reluctantly she agreed, though she realised that her



PHILBY...BURGESS...MACLEAN...a web of deceit turned Philby's confession into a final smokescreen.

THE CASE OF KIM PHILBY

evidence would imply that she had known that Philby was a Soviet spy for many years and had failed to report it.

The woman, who is still alive, was interviewed by the head of Soviet counter-espionage in MI5. She described to him how Philby, an old friend, had taken her out to lunch before World War II and told her that he was doing a very dangerous job for peace, working for the Comintern. He needed help and he asked her to join the 'cause'.

While the woman said that she had refused to help him, she con-

ceded that she had told him that he could always come to her for help if ever he was desperate, and that she would keep his secret.

This confession, in a rather wayward style, got Roger Hollis, by now head of the Security Services, Philby and he had been opposite numbers during the war.

Hollis, working out of Blenheim Palace, in Oxfordshire, headed the MI5 department responsible for overseeing Soviet and Communist operations in Britain and the Colonies; while Philby, in London, was involved with Secret Service operations against Russia outside Britain.

As Philby recalled later: "We both served on the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee and never failed to work out an agreed approach to present to the less well-informed representatives of the Service departments and the Foreign Office."

In the light of this new evidence, Hollis had to agree that Philby should be re-interrogated in Beirut.

Nicholas Elliott, a former close friend of Philby, was sent out under conditions of maximum security, for what everyone expected to be a most dramatic confrontation.

Yet, though only a tiny handful of people knew what was going on, it quickly became clear that Philby had been forewarned.

A check made by MI5 later showed that a very special KGB officer had visited Beirut in May 1963, shortly after the woman made her confession. His name was Yuri Modin. During his service in London before 1951, he had run Burgess, Maclean, Blunt, Philby and had supervised the defection of Burgess and Maclean.

His mission now was almost certainly to warn Philby of this potent danger to him and to discuss plans for dealing with it.

So why didn't Philby run then and there? The answer is that if he had done so, then there would have been no doubt in anyone's mind that there was still a mole in place in MI5.

Defection

So the best all-round solution for the KGB was for Philby to make a confession of old events no longer of consequence and use it to give misleading information to cover current operations. The confession would provide the reason for his eventual defection, the implications being that he could not trust any British intelligence officer.

There is little doubt that Philby's confession, which was tape-recorded, was written in advance under KGB control, most probably with Modin at his side. Philby's intense anxiety during the few weeks he had to wait for the showdown after Modin's warning can well account for his extreme drunkenness at the time.

Elliott travelled to Beirut early in January 1963 and remains satisfied that no indication of the purpose of his visit came from him or from any officials in the Embassy there. Further, I have established that the CIA, which had a mission in Beirut, was not told in advance of the coming interrogation, in spite of reports to the contrary.

Elliott telephoned Philby from a private flat, which had been hired and wired, and invited him round for a drink. The first time Philby saw him was "I said if you expect me to see you. In his diary Harold Macmillan recorded that Philby had confessed "in a drunken fit. In fact throughout his encounters with Elliott, he was sober.

Connivance

Without delay, Elliott told Philby that new evidence had come to light and that both White and Hollis no longer had any doubt about his guilt.

Without even asking what the new evidence was, Philby agreed to confess and said: "This was bound to happen one day. There was bound to be a defector, a cipher-clerk or a spy-in-place who would know about me." But at no time did he say for any detail.

About ten days later, on January 22, Philby disappeared from Beirut, probably on a Soviet freighter, and was never seen there again. It is believed, with the connivance of the Lebanese police, Modin may well have been with him.

While Elliott strongly suspected that Philby had been tipped off by an MI5 source, the Secret Service, whose man Philby had been, tended to accept the confession as a reasonably true account, though incomplete.

In MI5, however, there were some officers who regarded both the signed confession which Philby gave Elliott and the tape recordings of their conversations to be KGB confessions, and it was concluded that the KGB had been able to follow from sources within MI5 every nuance of the conduct of the Philby case from early 1962 onwards. Among the possible lies listed in MI5 was Philby's admission that he had been able to give Donald Maclean the final alert by telling him the precise date when he was to be interrogated.

Horrendous

In fact, it was most unlikely that Philby could ever have possessed that information. Only five senior officers of MI5 were in on the secret. One of these was Roger Hollis. The implications of that were horrendous.

There was someone inside MI5 who was providing the KGB with top secret information. And that information was used by Philby and his confederates to try to get the heat off the 'Mole' who was still in place.

That 'Mole' was likely to be a man at least as important inside Britain's Security Services as Philby had once been, and possibly even more so.

From Their Trade Is Treachery, by Chapman Pincher, to be published later this week by Sidgwick and Jackson, £7.50.



The Leeds changed interest rates

From 1st April 1981, the basic rate of interest charged to existing borrowers for owner occupation will be reduced to 13% (or the appropriate equivalent in the case of endowment and option mortgages).

The following reduced rates of interest will apply on savings accounts from 1st April 1981.

SUBSCRIPTION SHARES for regular savers	9.75%
PAID-UP SHARES for 'now and then' savers	8.50%
Basic rate income tax paid by the Society.	
HIGH RETURN OPTION SHARES for fixed term accounts	
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4 yrs. 10.00%	2 yrs. 9.25%
Basic rate income tax paid by the Society.	
DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS Ordinary accounts 8.25%	
Basic rate income tax paid by the Society.	
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TOMORROW: The KGB and Blunt...the sinister delays

Daily Mail

TUESDAY, MARCH 26, 1985

12p



Mail disclosures shock No 10 and
Prime Minister demands: Why
did none of my staff warn me?

MAGGIE FURY AT MI5 BOMBSHELL

TODAY Sir Roger and the
scandalous delays in the
Profumo and Blunt Affairs
SEE CENTRE PAGES

MARGARET THATCHER was shocked yesterday by the disclosure in the Daily Mail of evidence that former MI5 chief Sir Roger Hollis was suspected of having been a Russian spy.

Until the Mail's first edition was delivered to Downing Street late on Sunday night, she was unaware that, for the second time in her Premiership, a major security scandal was about to break.

With the revelations about Sir Roger coming on top of the unmasking of Anthony Blunt as a traitor, she was angry and worried.

Mrs Thatcher intends to make a full statement on the Hollis Affair in the Commons on Thursday.

Before leaving Downing Street for the Common Market summit in Maastricht, Holland, she ordered two investigations: 1. The current MI5 head, Sir Howard Smith, should forthwith make a full report to her on how the suspected treachery by Hollis when he held the job from 1956 to 1965 went undiscovered.

2. Sir Rupert Armstrong, head of the Cabinet Office, should assess the effect on Britain's security standing in the Western alliance of the revelations being published this week in the Mail in extracts from Chapman Pincher's new book *Their Trade is Treachery*.

More immediately, it was being asked in political circles how Downing Street did not know well in advance that a book with such disturbing implications for security was about to come out.

Normally, Whitehall ensures it has copies of books on sensitive issues long before review copies are issued to newspapers, under embargo, around three weeks before publication.

From JOHN DICKIE and GORDON GREIG
in Maastricht

As head of the security services, Mrs Thatcher is answerable to Parliament for every aspect of their conduct and she should have been warned.

Yet last night she was still waiting to know if her staff at Downing Street had obtained a copy of the book.

In contrast, somebody apparently did tell Hollis's widow that the storm was about to break. On Sunday morning, she was cancelling an appointment with the words: 'I have been told that I have to go away.'

Opposition

But Mrs Thatcher was left without an inkling until she read with great interest the front page of yesterday's Daily Mail.

Subsequently, she harried her staff over and over at the prospect of another Establishment cover-up, as happened over the Blunt Affair. In that case the Prime Minister defied opposition to insist on naming as a traitor the Queen's Adviser on the Royal Art Collection.

Once again an urgent check was being made to see if there was any

Turn to Page 2, Col 1



Suspect: The late Sir Roger Hollis

The world
picks
up the
Daily Mail

THE Daily Mail's disclosure about the MI5 affair was given prominence in newspapers and on TV and radio bulletins all over the world yesterday. In BRITAIN this morning's Times will carry the Daily Mail's full account of the Hollis affair which Mail readers saw yesterday.

By special agreement, The Times has arranged this week to publish the revelations on the day following their appearance in the Mail.

The Mail story dominated British radio and TV programmes yesterday.

In AMERICA, under the three column headline 'Dark story of a British knight', the New York Daily News ran the story at length.

HOLLAND: The news sent a buzz around the summit centre in Maastricht and one veteran Dutch diplomat said:

Turn to Page 2, Col 6

PAGE 2

Daily Mail, Tuesday, March 24, 1981

Daily Mail
MIS CHIEF WAS
RUSSIAN SPY
SUSPECT

Riddle of 'quit' message to Lady Hollis

By TED OLIVER

THE widow of suspected KGB agent Sir Roger Hollis vanished from her Somerset village a day before the storm over her husband broke.

On Sunday night, Lady Hollis should have been taking notes as honorary secretary of a parochial church committee at Cattcott on the north side of the Polden Hills.

But that morning the vicar, the Rev. John Graham, received a lone

phone message from her. She told him: 'I have been told that I have to go away.'

'I'm afraid that I can't say where or why, and I am not sure that I will be back.'

Yesterday the vicar said: 'I didn't know what it was all about until I saw the paper.'

'This is absolutely astounding news.'

Lady Hollis is a charming woman, a stalwart of the church who always has been. She is full of good works like taking the senior citizens in her car for outings.

Crossways, the stone cottage where Lady Hollis has lived for 20 years, is husband and wife eight years apart, and deserted yesterday.

Lady Hollis, who was Sir Roger's secretary at MI5 for 18 years before

their marriage, was his second wife. His first marriage ended in divorce.

Sir Roger's son, Alistair, a lecturer at Keble College, Oxford, said last night: 'At the end of the day, all I can hope is that my father's name will be cleared.'

'Nothing I knew of his opinions on his way of life, suggested that he would behave like this. It seems to me very strange that someone supposedly working for the Russians over a long period of time would not give something away to someone.'

'I was very close to my father and he never showed any particular political leaning. He would have voted for different parties depending upon the issue at the time.'

Sir Roger lived in Cattcott for five years before his death.



Lady Hollis: Left home

Neighbour Jack Fowles, a farmer, said: 'We all knew he had been in MI5. We had known for years, long before he died.'

'I don't know how it became common knowledge but it didn't seem to bother anyone very much.'

'He and his wife didn't really mix much with us. They were a different sort of people, different backgrounds and different accents.'

Another neighbour, Mrs Dorothy Gardiner, remembered Sir Roger as a very good man. . . . 'He was the sort of people went to if they needed help.'

LORD TREND, who conducted the inquiry over Sir Roger Hollis in 1974 — a year after Sir Roger's death — said yesterday: 'I have no comment to make on this at all.'

LORD TREND, 66, a former Secretary of the Cabinet, speaking from Lincoln College, Oxford, where he is now Chancellor, added: 'The Government has no comment and therefore I have no comment.'

The Prime Minister's Office also refused to say anything.

A spokesman said: 'We don't make comments on security matters.'

Sir Roger Hollis's brother, the Right Rev. Michael Hollis, Bishop of Maukau, said: 'I have not seen these allegations, and I am not interested in them.'

Former Tory MP Commander Anthony Courtney, 72, who was forced to resign his East Harrow seat after a Russian attempt to blackmail him over an affair with a woman spoke out yesterday in support of Sir Roger.

He said: 'I knew him for many years. He was a very dear friend, and I am sure he was not the slightest bit inclined to have been a KGB stooge.'

Blackmail

In 1971, Commander Courtney, who now lives in Devizes, Wiltshire, accused Sir Roger of laying himself open to blackmail.

He said yesterday: 'He made himself an obvious blackmail target through having a long affair with his secretary.'

He knew the KGB were keeping a hold on him, but it was never known whether they had attempted to blackmail him. If they had tried, I am sure he would not have given in.

Another former head of MI5, Sir Dick Goldsmith White, would not comment on the report.

Sir Dick, director-general of the service before Sir Roger took over, has publicly defended a former deputy director, Guy Liddell, after speculation in the wake of the Blunt scandal that a top Secret Service man was a Russian agent.

World news!

Continued from Page One

'Not another security leak by the British?'

It was widely quoted in BRUSSELS, and was given prominence over the Common Market summit.

One typical newspaper on German radio said: 'In London, the Daily Mail revealed exclusively today that a super mole once served at the head of Britain's Secret Intelligence Services.'

LUXEMBOURG TV described it as 'a new, startling revelation' about Britain's security services.

FRANCE: The news agency AFP reported the item in the air comment, adding: 'The Daily Mail, which friends use media reaction to foreign news stories, invariably comes 24 hours later.'

AUSTRALIA: In Melbourne, the mass circulation evening paper The Herald carried the story in a prominent position under the heading 'Top spy in KGB shock'.

Maggie orders probe into new spy scandal

Continued from Page One

evidence that the Establishment had been lax in not exposing a possible traitor within its own ranks.

Amid the hubbub at the BBC summit—and the security scandal overwhelmed other issues, relegating the clashes on fish, steel and farm prices—there was a searing anxiety that the Hollis affair could question the trust that Britain's allies, especially the US, had in Britain's security.

Labour MP Dennis Canavan is due to put the first Commons question over the affair to Deputy Prime Minister and Home Secretary William Whitelaw today.

Mr Whitelaw is expected to duck any direct question about Sir Roger, to swear off Mrs Thatcher's return from Hong Kong tonight.

Mr Canavan said that the Mail report seemed 'like yet another cover-up by the Establishment. If it is true, it is quite appalling.'

There is a great deal of public concern about the way



SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG

Ordered by Mrs Thatcher



SIR HOWARD SMITH

... to report urgently

in which our specialised security services are operated, especially after the Blunt scandal.'

Mrs Thatcher has insisted that the Hollis Affair is an issue of such gravity that she alone should face the Commons outcry and give her views of what happened and what can be done.

Tory MP Jonathan Aitken wanted the Prime Minister of weeks to go into detail about the correspondence.

Asked whether he had written to Mrs Thatcher about Hollis in 1979, he said: 'I confirm that this is true, but I regard the contents as confidential.'

Apparently Mrs Thatcher was worried that there might well still be serious gaps in her knowledge.

Under the present security system, her intelligence chiefs are required to respond with a complete answer to any specific query she raises.

But there are not in the habit of going beyond a precise area of any inquiries put to them.

Asked whether he had written to Mrs Thatcher about Hollis in 1979, he said: 'I confirm that this is true, but I regard the contents as confidential.'

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
Specific

chiefs that any weaknesses laid bare by the Hollis Affair have been successfully plugged in the years since he left the service.

In Parliament she will be under strong pressure to submit the whole issue to Lord Diplock's Security Commission—the high-level panel which investigates the evidence of security lapses.

See Reports

Domestic	Overseas	World	Books						
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60
61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70
71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80
81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90
91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100



Weatherwise

CLOUD and rain spreading from S.W. Windy. Outlook: still unsettled.

District Forecasts

S. & S. 15-16: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 16-17: Windy, S.W. 17-18: Windy, S. or S.W. 18-19: Windy, S. or S.W. 19-20: Windy, S. or S.W. 21-22: Windy, S. or S.W. 23-24: Windy, S. or S.W. 25-26: Windy, S. or S.W. 27-28: Windy, S. or S.W. 29-30: Windy, S. or S.W. 31-32: Windy, S. or S.W. 33-34: Windy, S. or S.W. 35-36: Windy, S. or S.W. 37-38: Windy, S. or S.W. 39-40: Windy, S. or S.W. 41-42: Windy, S. or S.W. 43-44: Windy, S. or S.W. 45-46: Windy, S. or S.W. 47-48: Windy, S. or S.W. 49-50: Windy, S. or S.W. 51-52: Windy, S. or S.W. 53-54: Windy, S. or S.W. 55-56: Windy, S. or S.W. 57-58: Windy, S. or S.W. 59-60: Windy, S. or S.W. 61-62: Windy, S. or S.W. 63-64: Windy, S. or S.W. 65-66: Windy, S. or S.W. 67-68: Windy, S. or S.W. 69-70: Windy, S. or S.W. 71-72: Windy, S. or S.W. 73-74: Windy, S. or S.W. 75-76: Windy, S. or S.W. 77-78: Windy, S. or S.W. 79-80: Windy, S. or S.W. 81-82: Windy, S. or S.W. 83-84: Windy, S. or S.W. 85-86: Windy, S. or S.W. 87-88: Windy, S. or S.W. 89-90: Windy, S. or S.W. 91-92: Windy, S. or S.W. 93-94: Windy, S. or S.W. 95-96: Windy, S. or S.W. 97-98: Windy, S. or S.W. 99-100: Windy, S. or S.W.

World Weather AT NOON YESTERDAY

C. Britain: S. 15-16: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 16-17: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 17-18: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 18-19: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 19-20: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 21-22: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 23-24: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 25-26: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 27-28: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 29-30: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 31-32: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 33-34: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 35-36: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 37-38: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 39-40: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 41-42: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 43-44: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 45-46: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 47-48: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 49-50: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 51-52: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 53-54: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 55-56: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 57-58: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 59-60: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 61-62: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 63-64: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 65-66: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 67-68: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 69-70: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 71-72: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 73-74: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 75-76: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 77-78: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 79-80: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 81-82: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 83-84: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 85-86: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 87-88: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 89-90: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 91-92: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 93-94: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 95-96: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 97-98: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W. 99-100: Windy, dry at first, with brief intervals of rain. Becoming wetter and more variable. Wind S. or S.W.

MAIL ABROAD — CHANNEL 4: 12pm BELGIUM 30 8.5; FRANCE 5 8.5; GERMANY 2:30 8.5; HOLLAND 2:35 8.5; ITALY 1:30 8.5; MALTA 14; PORTUGAL 75 8.5; SPAIN 80 8.5; SWITZERLAND 2:30 8.5

The Hollis Affair



Profumo, Blunt... or

SIR ROGER HOLLIS, as the head of MI5, was at the very heart of two of the greatest scandals in post-war Britain... the Profumo Affair, and the discovery that Anthony Blunt was a KGB agent. As suspicions about Roger Hollis hardened, security men began looking once again at the way these two affairs were handled by the country's security forces. What they uncovered horrified them. This week, for the first time, the full story of what are perhaps the most dramatic and sensational secret investigations ever conducted in this country can be told. During lengthy, humiliating interrogation in the Seventies, Sir Roger never broke, but his interrogators believed they had before them the most successful spy in history—a KGB spy so deeply dug in as a Super Spy that he made notorious names like Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt very much second league. These, then, are the files on Profumo and Blunt. They point with remorseless logic to a shocking conclusion.

THE PROFUMO AFFAIR

Warning for a spy, but not for the Minister

IT WAS on November 11, 1962, that a Labour Back Bench MP, military expert and trouble-shooter extraordinary, George Wigg, received a mysterious telephone call at the home of his party agent in his Dudley constituency.

His caller appeared to be speaking in a deliberately muffled voice. He said: 'Forget about the Vassall case. You want to look at Profumo.' So was set into motion an event which was to haunt British politics for years. The Profumo Affair.

It was, of course, this sad, unsavoury though often tragic story which was to lead to the premature retirement of Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister in the Autumn of 1963 and helped bring about the fall of the Tory Government in the 1964 General Election.

Call girl

Looking back, the suspicion must exist that the Soviets had deliberately and brilliantly engineered an event which was to bring as much embarrassment to the British Establishment and create a mood of cynicism which has never quite been removed from British politics ever since.

At the same time the course which the Profumo Affair was to take right through to its piffling finale was conditioned by the behaviour of the Director General of MI5, Sir Roger Hollis.

If the Director of the KGB at the Centre in Moscow had been controlling the case day by day he could hardly have handled it more effectively to Russia's advantage than Hollis did.

It is well known that Hollis repeatedly failed to do rather less what he did which called for censure. That censure has made at the time inside MI5 but the public was never allowed to hear of it.

As is well known, John Profumo, Minis-

ter of War, was having an affair at the time with a young call girl, Christine Keeler.

At the same time, she was on familiar terms with a senior member of Soviet Intelligence. Captain Eugene Ivanov, officially Assistant Naval Attaché at the Soviet Embassy, but known to MI5 for a period of six months before Profumo ever met Christine, was a senior member of GRU, the military arm of Soviet Espionage and Subversion.

What made MI5's conduct during the months that followed so extraordinarily difficult to understand was that Stephen Ward, Christine Keeler's protector, was an MI5 informant. It was not hard, therefore, for MI5 to discover that the Minister for War was having an affair with a girl who was also involved with a senior member of Russian Intelligence.

But MI5, under Sir Roger Hollis, did nothing and it must now be proved that the telephone call to George Wigg was a盖 to bring this whole embarrassing affair deliberately out into the open and this they succeeded in doing brilliantly.

It has been said in defence of the Government of the time, and said by Harold Macmillan, that there never was a real chance of a security breach. Ivanov seemed to be interested in nuclear weapons and Profumo certainly did not possess any kind of scientific background.

But it was not that sort of information that Ivanov was after. He wanted to know when the Americans were planning to arm West Germany with atomic weapons and the exact date when this was likely to occur so they could be ready with a weighty political counter.

Even though Sir Roger learned that Ivanov had asked Stephen Ward if he could get this information from his informant friend, MI5 did nothing, not even informing the Foreign Office that he was a spy.

And when it became clear that Profumo had fallen into the Keeler/Ward/Ivanov set, Sir Roger's only action



THE MAN AT THE HEART OF BOTH AFFAIRS: Sir Roger Hollis (centre), pictured on a visit to Germany, looking over the border into the East.

was to ask the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sir Norman Brook, to suggest to Profumo that he should try to get Ivanov to defect.

It was an outrageous suggestion. For no Minister of the Crown should ever be embroiled in espionage or counter-espionage, and at the same time it managed to distract attention from what ought to have been the main issue, to warn Profumo as to the dangers he was running into.

Certainly Hollis told no-one else in a position of authority about what was going on. The Home Secretary, Mr Henry Brooke, to whom Hollis was officially responsible, knew nothing about the matter at all when it was first raised in Parliament, and was given the background only after he had taken the initiative and sent for Hollis.

Main issue

But by that time the damage had been done. Ivanov, scandalously once more, as a result of a tip-off, had slipped out of Britain, and Hollis himself issued a remarkable instruction actually forbidding his officers to continue investigations.

'Until further notice no approach should be made to anyone in the Ward Galore, or to any other outside contact in respect of it. If we are approached we listen only.'

Hollis's Director of Counter-Espionage was so concerned about the lack of action that he put his view on record to Hollis stating:

'If a scandal results from Mr Profumo's association with Christine Keeler there is likely to be a considerable political rumpus...'

If, in any subsequent inquiries we are

information about Profumo and to have taken no action on it, we would, I am sure, be subject to much criticism for failing to bring it to light.'

I suggest that this information be passed to the Prime Minister and you might also like to consider whether or not, before doing so, we should interview Miss Keeler.

It was a memorandum which Hollis was to ignore to the subsequent embarrassment of MI5 and the near political ruin of Harold Macmillan.

When Hollis came to give evidence to the Denning inquiry on the Profumo affair there is some reason to believe that some of his evidence was at least untrue.

He told Denning that he did not learn of Profumo's sexual association with Keeler until the end of January, 1963, which, by strange coincidence, was exactly the time that Ivanov was warned to scurry home safely to Moscow.

There is evidence to suggest that MI5 watchers knew all about the Ward Galore affair, but MI5 officers whose hands had been tied by one negative directive after another from Hollis, not only disagreed with the findings of the Report but regarded the facts on which they had been based as a shameful indictment of their organisation and of their leader in particular.

The Profumo Affair was to ruin its principal actors. It was also to have a profound influence upon the future reputation of the man who stood in the shadows—Sir Roger Hollis.

One man dictated their fate

THE BLUNT SCANDAL

Two astonishing weeks when he just disappeared

THE behaviour of Roger Hollis during the confession and continuing interrogation of Anthony Blunt in the spring and summer of 1964 helped to intensify the suspicions against him.

The 'case officer' who induced Blunt to confess happened to be the man who first suspected Hollis, and was a prominent member of the MI5/Secret Service Committee, called the Fluency Committee, investigating Soviet penetrations of the Service.

Roger Hollis forced a row with this officer when he had barely begun to interrogate Blunt and suspended him from duty for a fortnight.

The case officer offered to carry on with the questioning of Blunt from his home, but Hollis forbade it. As a result Blunt was astonishingly left alone for two weeks, during which time nobody knows what he did although it is now thought he took the time so scandalously given to him to consult his Soviet employers.

Leakages

But Hollis was still not finished. He picked another quarrel with the same case officer, and, though he was very senior, summarily sacked him.

However, this time he did not get his own way. The man's reputation was so high that he was snapped up by the Secret Service and, to Hollis's mortification, remained on the Fluency Committee investigating the leakages.

Anthony Blunt was, in fact, a much more important Soviet agent than has yet been revealed. His crimes against his country, dragged out of him during hundreds of hours of taped interrogation, were such an indictment of wartime security that every effort has been made to cover them from public knowledge.

Firstly, I can reveal precisely what it was that happened in late 1963, which led to his unmasking:

A middle-aged American belonging to a rich and famous American family was invited to undertake a political task by the White House. Having a guilty complex about his secret past, he went to the FBI headquarters in Washington, hoping to clear himself before accepting the White House post.

There he confessed that he had been a Communist while in England at Cambridge University.

SCANDAL No. 1: John Profumo and Christine Keeler, inset, Soviet agent Eugene Ivanov



SCANDAL No. 2: KGB talent spotter Anthony Blunt with, inset, Guy Burgess, with whom he kept in close touch.

Since, he had been recruited to Soviet intelligence and had served the Russian interests for several years.

He named the man who had recruited him as Sir Anthony Blunt and said he was prepared to give evidence against Blunt in court if necessary.

The FBI passed this information to MI5 and it was only when confronted by it in April 1964 that Blunt decided to confess after being first assured that he would never face prosecution.

Blunt has said publicly that he felt free to confess because something that happened in 1964 'freed him from loyalties to his friends'. The sanctimonious hypocrite confessed because, for the first time in his treacherous life, he was frightened.

Blunt, who became the KGB's chief talent spotter in Cambridge, recruited several important spies before leaving for the USA in 1945. But he got himself snared in MI5 where he performed many valuable services for the Russians.

For many months Blunt served as the MI5 officer in charge of

the 'watchers', the men and women who carry out surveillance of hostile agents. As he was responsible for allocating their various tasks every week, he had also to be told of every counter-espionage operation in which they were involved.

He confessed he regularly gave all this information to the Russians so that Soviet Intelligence could operate against Britain in secret.

He warned the Russians that the Communist Party headquarters in London was being bugged and how it was done and also, most damagingly perhaps of all, kept the Soviets regularly informed about the personnel in MI5.

In the Registry of MI5 each file on its member is entitled 'Soviet' or 'Greek' or the case of Blunt, believed to be unknown to the KGB: 'Soviet Amber' for those who might be known; 'Soviet Red' for those definitely known.

As a result of Blunt's activities alone, apart from those of the other spies in the organisation, every member was really 'Soviet'.

bluet Red' during the whole period he was working there. In a similar way Blunt also prejudiced many American operations and endangered their personnel because he informed the Russians about the activities of the U.S. war-time intelligence organisation, the Office of Strategic Services, whose members worked alongside MI5 in joint endeavours from 1943 onwards.

Blunt had no further access to secret documents after he left MI5 in 1945. But he remained in close touch with Guy Liddell, the Deputy Director of MI5 who, having no knowledge of Blunt's treachery, shared interesting MI5 gossip with him.

Defection

However, this does not mean that Blunt implies that he was working for the Russians. Spies cannot function effectively in a foreign land without home-grown assistance to do routine work like finding safe houses, organising dead letter boxes, serving as paymaster and so on. This became Blunt's new role.

He told his interrogators, for instance, how he had applied a double life to himself when a commoner in the East End of London where Burgess had left information and where he found a pile of money left for Burgess by the KGB.

Though Blunt did not, contrary to previously published information, know the precise date on which he had defected to the KGB and so could not therefore have tipped him off, he did keep in close touch with Guy Burgess during the vital period that he was planning his defection.

One question which has never been resolved about the Blunt affair is: did the Queen know that some of her employees, Surveyor of the Royal Pictures, had admitted to being a Soviet spy?

Normally writers do not really know what the Queen does or says but, because of a fluke circumstance, I know that the Queen was properly alerted to the Blunt situation. Her Private Secretary, Sir Alan Acland, as soon as he had received details of Blunt's confessions. She merely asked what the official advice was and, on being told that he should be left where he was, agreed to accept it in the national interest.

Presumably, the Queen experienced some distaste, but she rarely had occasion to meet Blunt.

From Their Trade Is Treachery, by Chapman Pincher, to be published later this week by Sidgwick and Jackson, £7.50.

TOMORROW: Revealed... the Left-wing MP who was a double agent

HOME'S STANDARD EXCLUSIVE news disclosures in the Mail

LABOUR PARTY CHAIRMAN WAS DOUBLE AGENT

By CHAPMAN PINCHER

TOM DIBERG, Left-wing Labour MP, ex-chairman of the Labour Party, member of the National Executive and finally life peer, was a double agent, working for the KGB and MI5.

I can reveal that Diberg, who died in 1976 aged 71, reported on the personal and political activities of his friends and colleagues in Parliament to both agencies.

He did this from the moment he first entered the House in 1942 to when he

A LIFE OF BETRAYAL

Pages 30 and 31

HOW I EXPOSED BLUNT

Page SIX

finally retired in 1974, and thereafter when he became a member of the House of Lords.

Both MI5 and the KGB had no illusions about the fact that he was working for the other side and both sought to use him for their own purposes.

There was only one occasion that MI5 had seriously to take him to task. That was when they discovered that, not content with working for them and the KGB, he had found himself a third paymaster—the Czechs.

Apart from the money he received from his clandestine activities, Diberg's relations with MI5 were to be of immense benefit to him personally. He was a compulsive homosexual, repeatedly caught either procuring or committing a homosexual act in public places.

Yet though such behaviour was unlawful and invariably led to prosecution, Diberg escaped retribution. The extraordinary

Turn to Page 2, Col 5



BACK in custody at last... escaped Great Train Robber Ronald Biggs yesterday with police in Bridgetown, Barbados. Extradition proceedings are expected soon—they could last about four weeks—to bring him back to Britain to serve the rest of his 30-year jail sentence. Biggs has hired

lawyers to resist this move and wants to return to Brazil. He was detained after being found on a yacht with a group who had apparently kidnapped him in Rio de Janeiro. Mystery still remains about the their motives... and... and... Details and more pictures—Pages TWO, THREE and FOUR.

**BL boss
shot in
H-block
protest**

A TOP Leyland executive was shot in an IRA-style attack as he addressed a conference in Dublin yesterday.

Industrial relations director Mr Godfrey Armstrong, 35, was wounded in the leg after three gunmen burst into the packed university hall where he was speaking. One shouted an H-block protest.

Last night Mr Armstrong was recovering in a Dublin hospital. He is expected to be home today.

Mr Armstrong, married with three young children, had been talking to hundreds of businessmen at an industrial relations seminar for about ten minutes when the attackers struck.

Casped

The men, two wearing balaclavas and the third with a scarf round his head, entered the hall of Trinity College's arts building. One held the door open and the second covered the audience, while the third advanced towards the rostrum.

Pointing his handgun at Mr Armstrong, he shouted: "Freeze." As the audience gaped in horror, he fired two shots into Mr Armstrong's left below the knee at close range. One attacker shouted: "This is in support of the H-block protest."

Conference organiser Elizabeth Harpin dashed forward and caught Mr Armstrong before he fell. The gang fled.

Turn to Page 2, Col 1

ORDON in Bridgetown, Barbados

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then, in a very formal manner told Police Commissioner Aviston Presod:

I would like to say I have no complaints about the treatment from my captors, but I would like to go back to Brazil.

He paused, looked at the ring of police officers and added with a grin: 'But I realise it is probably impossible.'

Within hours, however, he had sent for local lawyer Ezra Alleyne and informed the Brazilian Consul here that he wanted to go back.

And a New York criminal lawyer, David Neufeld, was on his way from the U.S.

He had been hired by a friend of Biggs, German photographer Armin Heim and a New Yorker who identified himself only as Fred.

The story Biggs told the

Barbadian police was essentially the same one as a freelance journalist, said to be acting for the kidnappers, was putting out on their behalf.

This was that the snatch group was led by 36-year-old John Miller (also known as McKillop) of Single Point, a London security firm. The same group had tried unsuccessfully to grab him two years ago.

Meeting

Miller and Patrick King, a Londoner who runs a taxi firm in Hendon, were collected in a police van from the Holiday Inn in Bridgetown last night and taken in for questioning.

Biggs said he was lured into arranging a meeting to discuss what he thought was a financial deal.

Biggs was there first. Then, he said the restaurant doors burst open. The first person he recognised was Miller. I said: 'Oh no, not you.' I

knew what was happening.

According to Biggs, he was grabbed, punched in the side of the head and hurled across the table.

In the ensuing uproar, it was said, the tear gas Mace was sprayed, and a civilian and an off-duty policeman were knocked down.

Biggs said: 'They tied me up, gagged me and bundled me into a bag.'

Said the freelance journalist, Gerry Brown: 'Mace gas was used at the Rio end, and he may have been bruised. They zipped him up in a canvas bag with four carrying handles to take him to an aircraft waiting outside Rio.'

The plane landed at Belém, where a second vehicle took the party to the quayside.

Biggs said: 'They let me out then. They said if I caused any trouble, they would kill my son. They had a lot of details. I knew I couldn't get away, so I just walked on to the yacht.'

The yacht was the *Nowcanni*.

tape-recorded and allowed on

Filmed

There is still mystery over the motivation of the people behind the snatch and whether Biggs himself was in on the plot. That is puzzling everyone, not least the Barbadian Police.

Last night Miller denied that there was a book or film deal in the offing. He claimed he and his men had been paid simply to bring Biggs back to justice. He would not say by whom or why.

Shortly before Biggs arrived on the island, John Miller got married in the Holiday Inn. The service took place in the dining room beside the swimming pool. His bride is Sarah Hannam, daughter of a merchant banker.

They toasted each other in champagne bought by British television crews. One of the guests was comedian Jim Davidson. Miller, however, abruptly left the reception. News came through that the yacht with Biggs was approaching.

BL chief



Victim: Mr Armstrong

Police chiefs fear that the outrage indicates a sinister new direction in terrorist tactics. They believe that in addition to military and political targets, senior civilian officials of major British companies with interests in the republic may now be on a target list.

Last night BL said it had no idea why Mr Armstrong should have been attacked.

Police mounted a watch on Mr Armstrong's Midlands home last night.

His wife Diane was holding a children's party to celebrate her son Daniel's third birthday when a BL executive telephoned with news of the shooting.

Mrs Armstrong remained calm and carried on with the party.

Wind S., fresh or strong. Max 12 to 14c, 34 to 57i.


17, 18, 19, 21, 22: Cloudy with occasional rain and hill fog. Becoming drier. Winds S., moderate or fresh. Max. 12 to 14c, 34 to 57i.

23, 24, 26, 27, 28: Cloudy with occasional rain, heavy at times and hill fog. Winds E. or S.E., fresh or strong. Max. 7.

25, 26: showers, hill and inland.

Cloud, F-fair, F-rain, S-sun.

C 10 50 Majewo ... S 19 66 Prague ... C 12 54
S 31 68 Malaga ... S 28 68 Riyadh ... C 34 93
C 12 50 Malta ... S 16 41 Rome ... F 17 43
C 18 64 Moscow ... S 18 58 Tangier ... S 26 68
R 11 52 Oslo ... C 3 37 Tel Aviv ... S 18 64
F 14 61 Paris ... R 12 54 Warsaw ... C 10 50



YESTERDAY (24 hr. to 6 p.m.):
Wales: Colwyn Bay, North Wales, 16c, 61i. Caled. Glenc. Dumfries, 20c, 69i. Scotland: 20c, 72i. Wick, Scotland, 6c, 9i. Scotland: Lerwick, Shetland (Shetlands) 7i. London: Max 15c, 55i. Min: 16c, 50f. Sun: Nil. Rain: 0-02in. Barometer (6 p.m.): 1006.5 millibars. 29-62i. steady. Humidity 87 per cent.

Snow Reports

Depth (in.)	State
Lower upper slopes	Upper slopes
28	Good
20	Fair
14	Fair
44	Fair
12	Good
12	Fair
40	Fair
14	Good
10	Good
32	Good
8	Good
20	Good

Andorra ... 28 152 Good
Austria ... 14 72 Fair
Czechoslovakia ... 14 74 Poor
Denmark ... 12 64 Fair
Finland ... 12 206 Fair
Iceland ... 12 74 Poor
Ireland ... 40 184 Fair
Sw. Africa ... 14 176 Good
Germany ... 10 161 Good
K. in the Atlantic ... 32 — Good
Netherlands ... 8 161 Good
Oberstdorf ... 20 152 Good

SCOTLAND: —Calderdale: Most runs closed. Wet snow on hill bases. Glenlivet: A few runs open, but narrow. Wet snow. Glencoe: All runs open. Wet snow on hill bases. Leoch: All runs open. Wet snow on hill bases.

secrets as such to the Russians, he nevertheless consistently betrayed everyone with whom he came into contact.

He reported at length over a period of 30 years on the private lives of his most senior ministerial colleagues.

This invariably secured his release, as MI5 put the mantle of its protection around him.

Throughout his career, Dribberg, who was to become Lord Bradwell in Mr Harold Wilson's honours list of December, 1975, was prosecuted only once. That was in the 30s because of the persistence of two members of the public, who insisted that action should be taken against him. He was found not guilty.

Though Dribberg was never in a position to pass on State

information as part of their file on MPs they were worried about. The Russians could also have used it as blackmail material.

He even betrayed Guy Burgess who, feeling wretched and homesick in his self-imposed exile in Moscow, saw in Tom Dribberg, his one friend, the only Englishman he could trust. As it was, as I explain in the centre pages today, it was Tom Dribberg who was directly and cynically responsible for scuppering any vague illusion that Burgess might ever have entertained that he could return to this country.

• ALAN YOUNG reports from Westminster: A Labour MP who tried yesterday to raise the case of MI5 chief Sir Roger Hollis was halted by Speaker Mr George Thomas.

Mr Arthur Lewis, MP for Newham North-West, asked how much money had been spent in educating the various Soviet Knights like Sir Anthony Blunt and Sir Roger Hollis?

PAGE 30

Daily Mail, Wednesday, March 25, 1981

The Hollis Affair

THE MAIL'S exclusive series, uncovering some of the most sensational — and best-kept secrets of espionage in Britain since the war, has brought a shocked reaction from the Establishment and politics. Today: more revelations, as the row rages over the affair of Sir Roger Hollis, the head of MI5 for nine years who was not only suspected of being a spy, but possibly of being the most successful super-spies in this country's history, so deeply dug in that he put notorious names like Burgess, Maclean, Philby and Blunt in the second league. Now Chapman Pincher exposes the activities of another agent, one who also had far-reaching consequences, only this time he was on the side of MI5. Or so it seemed....

The MP code-named Crocodile... and his astounding life of betrayal

By
CHAPMAN PINCHER

BRITAIN'S FOREMOST AUTHORITY ON ESPIONAGE

TOM DRIBERG, or Baron Bradwell *juxta Mare*, as he was to become in 1975, was perhaps one of the most extraordinary and certainly most colourful agents that MI5 have ever recruited.

His cover was never less than brilliant. Some may have suspected that he worked for the KGB (which he did as well) but no one ever guessed that the man who was to become Chairman of the Labour Party was on the payroll of the Security Services.

The man who always stood on the far Left of his party did so because MI5 had, while he was still a schoolboy, introduced him into the Communist Party. His life thereafter was to be brilliant.

It was while he was at Lancing College that he went running, the late Maxwell Knight, well known for his BBC talks on natural history, instructed him to join the Brighton branch of the Communist Party.

He continued as a member of the Party while at Christchurch, Oxford, and was still a member when he joined the Daily Express in 1928.

However, MI5's hopes of employing him as a long-term agent inside the Communist Party was soon to collapse.

In 1934, reports from an MI5 agent with the code name MI crossed the desk of Anthony Blunt.

Expelled

Blunt was asked by the Russians to try to establish the identity of MI but failed to do so. Subsequently he was sent by a Russian controller that Soviet Intelligence had discovered MI5 was Driberg.

With unusual chutzpah, the Russians alerted Harry Pollitt, the General Secretary of the Communist Party about the spy in his camp. Because of this, he summarily expelled Driberg from the Party.

Nevertheless, through the Russians knew about Driberg, MI5 continued

to use him and his value soared when he entered Parliament and was able to report on the activities of MI5 to both sides of the House.

After the war, the KGB, knowing of his AGIS connection, tried to use Driberg to feed false information to mainland British Intelligence. To this end they persuaded Harry Pollitt to induce him back into the Party as a clandestine member, something which Pollitt assured Driberg was already the position of several other MPs. Driberg reported the whole episode to MI5 and was told to keep the channels to Pollitt open.

After Driberg visited Moscow in 1946 to see Guy Burgess about the possibility of writing a book about him, he reported back to MI5 that the Russians had asked him to provide information to them about the internal proceedings of the Labour Party.

Trysts


He was well placed to do so after having been elected to the National Executive in 1949 where he remained until his retirement from Parliament in 1974.

As Labour was not in office, MI5 had no commitment to it, so it was agreed that Driberg could report what he liked about his own Party to anyone since no official secrets were involved. In return he promised to use his connection with the KGB in MI5's interest whenever possible.

The Russians gave Driberg two identical brief-cases. When he handed one containing his reports to the Russians in London they handed him the other containing his payment in banknotes.

Under agreement with the security authorities, Driberg was supposed to tell all his money, as well as copies of his reports, to MI5. Over a period of several years he handed in wads of notes amounting to many thousands of pounds, but there seems to be little doubt that he began to retain more and more of the money for himself.

Driberg reported at length on the private lives of his most senior ministerial colleagues, including some close friends, and on other MPs, men and women, of all parties,



Tom Driberg: Ex-chairman of the Labour Party... code-named 'Crocodile' by the KGB.

given to philandering, as well as on political activities.

This material went not only to the Russians, who could use it for recruiting purposes, but to MI5 as well.

To swell his information, he lent his flat to Parliamentary colleagues, including ministers, for lunch-time trysts. He invariably made subsequent searches in the hope of discovering the identities of ladies who had been taken there.

Slanders

On one occasion, after lending the flat to a senior colleague, he found an envelope in the handwriting of a woman MP, which he recognised. He then had the courage to accuse the colleague concerned of risking damage to the Party by causing what could easily have become an open scandal.

Both MI5 and the KGB benefited from Driberg's activities. MI5 was able to extend its knowledge of

crypto-Communists in the Labour Party machine as well as in Parliament. The Russians were able to extend their list of those with character weaknesses who might be susceptible to blackmail.

In the context of Driberg's double agent efforts for MI5 and the KGB, the circumstances which enabled him to write his book, Guy Burgess — Narrative in Dialogue, are intriguing. In this sense, the word "Narrative" has not been applied before. It is that when Driberg travelled to Moscow to see Burgess, with the intention of preparing the book, he did so with the blessing of both MI5 and the KGB! MI5 knew that the book would be a disinformation exercise, controlled and checked both in the preparation and the proof stage by the KGB. MI5 also knew that Driberg would submit the proofs to it for vetting and that therefore, it would be party to the KGB operation.

In the book, Burgess denied he had ever been a Russian spy, and Driberg ended the book by stating

that he believed him. This was a blatant falsehood by Driberg.

In the event, Driberg's book contained enough lies and slanders against MI5 and the political system of the West for the KGB to be pleased with it, but MI5 was not too bothered with this because they believed they got a worthwhile trade-off.

astonishingly at the time, there was no real reason why Guy Burgess should not have returned to London. There was no actual evidence against him to hold him and MI5 was terrified, knowing that he hated living in Moscow, that he might suddenly return one day, was around Britain, cocking a snook at both the security services and the British public.

Censored

So Driberg's task was to induce Burgess to recall some details of his brief time in the highly secret wartime Special Operations Executive and to name some of the people who had worked with him. This Driberg succeeded in doing.

The publishers, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, were totally unaware of the part they were playing in this extraordinary game of blind when they were warned that they risked prosecution under the Official Secrets Act unless they removed the censored parts of the manuscript before publication, which in all innocence they duly did.


In the meantime I was approached by an outsider to write a story in my newspaper to say that because of what Burgess had told Driberg, the author now had evidence which could lead to the arrest and prosecution of Guy Burgess should he ever return to Britain because he had committed a provable breach of the Official Secrets Act. So Burgess was effectively frightened off.

Suspected

It was an extraordinary episode from which nearly everyone gained. Driberg made money, both out of his publishing and out of the funds of KGB and MI5. The KGB was happy because it managed to put across its story and MI5 was contented because it used this device to ensure that Burgess himself was never able to return to Britain.

Burgess died aged 52 in 1983, lonely and homesick in Moscow, perhaps only guessing how just as he had betrayed his friends, so Driberg had betrayed him.

As with many double agents, Driberg was suspected by MI5 of doing more for the Soviet side than he

1981
Daily Mail, Wednesday, March 25, 1981

Meeting point in Moscow for Dribberg and Burgess: and behind it, an elaborate double-cross

admitted in his regular debriefings. Then in 1968 the Czech defector, Josef Proklik, who laid information against several Labour MPs, gave secret information about a senior Labour MP who was a homosexual, had been recruited by Czech intelligence and had the code-name 'Crocodile'.

Proklik described how the Czech intelligence man in London had been smartly censured by the KGB for approaching Dribberg because 'Crocodile' was already that man. Proklik, who had seen 'Crocodile' but did not know his name, identified him as Dribberg from a spread of photographs shown to him by MI5.

Squabbles

Dribberg was therefore taxed with this information by the MI5 case-officer handling him. 'Have you ever done anything for the Czechs?' he was asked. 'I have written them a few articles,' he replied with a shrug.

Under questioning, however, he admitted that he had sold to the Czechs additional information about the internal squabbles of the Labour Party and personal details about who was sleeping with whom. 'All harmless stuff,' Dribberg insisted with his usual charm.

He admitted that he had continued to do this while Chairman of the Labour Party in 1968 passing the information to his Czech contacts whom he knew only as 'Vaclav'.

Apart from warning him about the dangers of giving the Russians any information which had not been passed by MI5, there was nothing the security authorities could do or wanted to do in view of the scandal which open knowledge of the way they had employed the Labour Party chairman would create.

Favours

An opportunity for MI5 to dispense with Dribberg's services had arisen during the premiership of Harold Macmillan, who had discovered that several MPs, mainly Tories, were being run by MI5 as agents.

The MI5 chiefs were told that this was no longer permissible and the MPs were all paid off with the exception of Dribberg, who refused to give up his contacts to report information to MI5 even after he had been elevated to the Lords as Lord Bradwell, being known in MI5

headquarters as 'The Lord of the Spies'.

The award of a peerage to such a notorious homosexual, who had admitted to another MP, Woodrow Wyatt, that he had once enjoyed the favours of a House of Commons employee in the Members' Library, was also a cause for public curiosity. While the award was made by Harold Wilson, ostensibly for Dribberg's devotion to the Labour Party, it had been requested by his MP, Michael Foot.

Lady Fairbender explained to me that Foot felt sorry for Dribberg because he was going blind, a fact confirmed to me by smother of his

friends. Mervyn Stockwood, the Bishop of Southwark, Foot, apparently, had never asked for an honour on behalf of anybody before and Wilson felt that he could not refuse.

Blackmail

Inquiries after Lord Bradwell's death in 1973 convinced MI5 that he had been controlled primarily by the KGB since the end of the war, partly because he may have been blackmailed, but mainly because he had moved farther to the Left.

The KGB had plenty of incriminating photographs. He had even been caught in a homosexual situation with Burgess when he visited him in Moscow and was shown the photographs as an extra 'inducement', as he reported to MI5 on his return.

To his friends Dribberg pretended that because his homosexuality was so well known, photographs, however revealing, would be useless as blackmail. In reality this was far from being the case, as Dribberg well knew.

All the KGB needed to do was to post prints of the pictures to various influential people and to newspapers and magazines.

The publicity would have made it impossible for MI5 to continue to support Dribberg's immunity from arrest, for his propensity for committing homosexual acts in public places remained an offence. It would also have ended his political career.

It would have been no more than just if Dribberg had been betrayed, for the overall verdict on him—in journalism, politics and Intelligence—is that eventually, he betrayed everybody. His deceitful behaviour over so many years hardly justified Michael Foot's posthumous tribute that 'he never bungled from his Socialist convictions'.

... And the MP who recruited for Moscow

SIR Martin Furnival Jones, the ex-Head of MI5, once said: 'If the Russian Intelligence Service can recruit a Back Bench MP and he climbs to a Ministerial position, the spy is home and dry.'

We did not make that remark without case evidence to back it.

MI5 and Special Branch, acting on information provided by directors and by surveillance of Soviet Bloc intelligence officers, have taken into account more than 60 Labour MPs and one or two or three of Labour Peers.

Such files indicate that while some are or have been helpful to the Soviet cause for money, sometimes coupled with threat of blackmail, the majority are ideological as acts of influence, giving their assistance because they are secret members of the Communist Party.

An instructive example of suspected Soviet penetration of the House of Commons concerns a former Labour MP for Acton, Bernard Floud.

In 1967 Harold Wilson wanted to make Floud a Junior Minister and it is standard practice that if a Prime Minister wishes to give office to an MP, MI5 is specifically asked if he has anything to his detriment in this case there was plenty.

It was known that Floud had been recruited to the Soviet cause at Oxford by James Kudmann, a Communist best known for his activities at the rival University of Cambridge.

Floud, in turn, had recruited others including a woman who later managed to inculcate herself into a highly sensitive position in the

Home Office. She had been interrogated and had named Floud as her recruiter.

Wilson, told that there was serious suspicion against Floud involving Communism and possibly espionage, gave permission for Floud to be interviewed so that the security authorities could judge whether his activities had been no more than youthful folly.

Floud was interrogated closely for two weeks during which he denied any connection with the KGB. Then, on being shown evidence, he claimed that he could not recall it.

The MI5 men suspected he was still in touch with Soviet intelligence but told him that if he confessed his past activities and could convince them that he was no longer involved they would not object to his appointment.

Floud did not react to the offer, even after prolonged thought, so he was interviewed again. This time nothing further and while MI5 could not give him clearance, they needed to persist with their questions and inquiries for a little longer.

After an unproductive session in October 1967, Floud went home, wrapped himself in a blanket with a gas poker, turned on the tap and killed himself.

From Their Trade Is Treachery, by Chapman Plasker, to be published this week by Sidgwick and Jackson, £7.95.

Put the fun back into keeping fit with the BH Home Cycle from Puch.


It's the perfect answer for people who want to get on the road to fitness in the comfort of their home or in the office.

With fully adjustable handlebars and saddle, speedo and timer it's ideal for all the family - from grandad to the grandkids.

The BH Home Cycle combines cycling with a unique alternative rowing action. So you get the double benefit of two separate exercises on one machine.

Just follow the step-by-step exercise programme for a few minutes every day. And you'll soon start to feel so much fitter, healthier and full of life.

See the BH Home Cycle at Leading Departmental and Sports Stores including Lillywhites, Atria and Intersport. Or send for further details to Steyr-Daimler-Puch Ltd., (Dept. DH25 1/81), Steyr-Puch House, 211 Lower Parliament Street, Nottingham, NG1 1FZ.



HOW TO PUT THE FUN BACK INTO KEEPING FIT

TOMORROW: The Real Fifth Man

Affair

WORKING EXCLUSIVELY

red: yet another spy high Secret Service hierarchy

NOTORIOUS NEST OF SPY AGENTS



THAT BETRAYED BRITAIN . . . top, a picture of togetherness for Kim Philby and George Blake. Above, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess and Anthony Blunt.

ed unquestionably the espionage to the Nazis and the war.

ever confess to having

Russians though the

deep overwhelming.

Interrogators' consensus

was records, was that

Russia after the war

had done before the war,

that it would never be

assessed of

in his country, but

of those who deal with

it as seemed likely,

was

something like 30

put Philby's in the

He worked with such apparent effect

that he was eventually awarded the U.S.

Legion of Merit to add to his CMO, CBE

and OBE.

Ellis was different from those other

KGB agents who have infiltrated our intel-

ligence services. All of them had become

secret Communists before they ever joined.

Ellis was a loyal Secret Service man who

was suborned by enemy agents as a mem-

ber of the Service.

Recruit

In 1924 Ellis, who had married into a White Russian family, the Zilenskies, was posted to Paris with a journalistic job as a cover to operate in the little White Russian community there which was known to be heavily penetrated by Soviet Military Intelligence. Among agents Ellis eventually recruited in Paris, was his brother-in-law, Alexander Zilenski, who was a valuable source because he had access to a man called Walther von Petrow.

Von Petrow was part of an espionage chain which, as the Nazis came to power in

Germany, reached out to Heinrich Himmler and Alfred Rosenberg, both close to Hitler. As World War II drew near, Ellis used the chain to send back a mass of confidential information about Nazi affairs, but most of which turned out to be fake.

Many years later the Secret Service was to know why. While investigating files relating to Kim Philby, the MI5 investigating team found a thick file on Von Petrow in the CID records. This file showed that Von Petrow had been working for the Germans and the Russians.

A German officer, under interrogation and the Von Petrow had assured him that he was an excellent source of high grade intelligence inside the British Secret Service, material which consistently produced information of the utmost value. These British secrets had not reached Von Petrow but through an intermediary, Zilenski, who was also a double agent.

Following up this lead, MI5 found another captured German officer, able to confirm that Zilenski was a German spy and that his British source was a certain Captain Ellis.

However, though they had this frightening

The slips that pointed to the elusive Fifth man



OSCOW CENTRE — KGB headquarters—was proud of what it called The Ring of Five. These were Soviet agents all operating in high positions in Britain, all recruited at about the same time in Cambridge and all friends.

We already know four of them — Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Kim Philby and Anthony Blunt. The identity of the fifth has so far eluded all researchers outside MI5 itself.

It has been established that he was a defence scientist in a most sensitive position in Government service but he is NOT, I am able to confirm, Dr Basil Mann, the atomic scientist living in the U.S. who recently been named as a suspect.

While Hollis remained Head of MI5 he refused to allow the case officers who interrogated Anthony Blunt to interview the scientist they suspected.

Soon after Hollis retired in 1965, however, inquiries involving telephone tapping and surveillance revealed that the scientist and his wife were both still secret Communists. It was also discovered that MI5 had been warned about the man 10 years previously but nothing had been done.

As the man was about to be given special clearance to visit secret American installations, he had to be pulled in sooner than the authorities would have liked, for an interrogation which lasted six weeks.

He admitted that he was still a committed Communist and had breached the Civil Service security rules by failing to admit it on his competitive vetting form. He admitted meeting Otto, the early Russian contact of the Ring of Five, while he himself had been at Cambridge.

Quarreled

He agreed that he had ceased to be an overt Communist and had made a pretence of seeming to be Right-Wing in order to secure a post in a Government defence establishment.

The scientist insisted that he had never given any secret information to the Russians but, when confronted with evidence, he admitted that he did occasionally meet Russians from the Soviet Embassy and appreciated that they might be intelligence officers. Again, he admitted that he had breached security regulations in failing to report such contacts, even if they had been innocent.

He was shown a spread of photographs of Soviet intelligence officers, and picked out pictures of two whom he had met. One was Yuri Modin, Blunt's controller for a time and the man who had supervised the defections of Burgess and Maclean.

The other was Sergei Kondrashev, a senior KGB officer who had served in Britain. It seemed unlikely that he would have met two such active spymasters on purely social terms, and what followed made it even more improbable.

Four years previously, in 1981, the important KGB defector, Anatoli Golitsin, had reported on Kondrashev, saying that he had been specially trained to control two very important spies in Britain. One proved to be George Blake, the spy inside the Secret Service, while the other, who had not then been detected, was known to be in defence work.

Golitsin had recalled how this Communist scientist had quarrelled with Kondrashev, whom he considered to be 'too bourgeois' for a Russian Communist.

When the suspect Fifth Man saw Kondrashev, he exclaimed: 'I hated the man. He was so bourgeois. You know—he were blases and had a pet poodle!' Such are the chance remarks which can mean so much to an astute counter-espionage interrogator who has done his homework.

As a last-ditch effort to induce the suspect to



SIR MARTIN FURNIVAL JONES . . . MI5 chief who had to decide what action to take against the suspected Fifth Man.

talk, a confrontation was arranged between Blunt and Blunt in Brown's Hotel. The interrogators provided plenty of drinks—gin for Blunt, sherry for the suspect and watered whisky for themselves.

During the long session, which lasted until after midnight, they talked about the Russian Intelligence officer Yuri Modin, and among the slips the suspect made was to call him by code name 'Peter', which he would be unlikely to have known unless professionally involved with him.

The suspect was the first to leave, whereupon Blunt, who had polished off a whole bottle of gin, remarked: 'You have convinced me that he was one of us.'

Blunt then recalled that after the 1953 crisis, when Philby had been very touchily interrogated by Helmut Milmo, the barrister, now a judge, Philby had told him: 'They didn't seem to know about my return to Austria. Thank God they didn't.'

Blunt then suggested that Philby might well have been referring to the recruitment of the Fifth Man. Blunt was informed that recruitment but Philby had been involved in it in some way. What was known about the suspect's life and activities at Cambridge fitted the date of Philby's return.

Evidence

As the suspect had been positively vetted three times, at intervals, and each time had failed to admit that he had been a Communist, he knew that his career would be blighted. He also knew that he would be barred from further access to secrets and was not allowed to visit the American installation, the CIA being given the reason.

To induce him to confess he was offered the chance of immunity from prosecution if he would co-operate, but he leered the proposal as though he had not heard it, perhaps resenting it in his mind in case he might, one day, be faced with harder evidence.

The MI5 chiefs, then headed by Sir Martin Furnival Jones, met with Civil Service representatives to decide what other action should be taken against the suspect.

As he was quite close to retirement—and perhaps to cover up the suspicions, which could have serious consequences for the Anglo-American exchange of defence secrets—he was allowed to retire early for 'personal reasons' and on full pension.

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